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We investigate the effect of judicial efficiency on banks’ lending spreads for a large cross 
section of countries. We measure bank interest rate spreads for 106 countries at an 
aggregate level and for 32 countries at the level of individual banks. We find that, after 
controlling for a number of other country characteristics, judicial efficiency, in addition 
to inflation, is the main driver of interest rate spreads across countries. This suggests that 
in addition to improving the overall macroeconomic climate in a country, judicial 
reforms, through a better enforcement of legal contracts, are critical to lowering the cost 
of financial intermediation for households and firms. 
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One of the motivations behind judicial reforms is that they improve the 
investment climate. It is believed that a transparent and efficient judiciary system by 
providing a better protection of creditor rights and faster trials in the occurrence of a loan 
default may reduce the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of loans payoffs in a bad 
state of the world. A larger amount of recovery and a shorter time to repossess collateral 
in the event of default are thought to induce banks to reduce the spread over borrowing 
rates and charge their customers a lower lending rate. By reducing the level of real 
lending rates banks succeed not only in reaching out customers further down in the 
demand curve but also, by reducing the relevance of adverse selection and moral hazard 
phenomena, they are likely to succeed in widening the supply of credit to previously 
rationed customers. 
  While there is a rather uncontroversial evidence that a more efficient judicial 
system and a more effective protection of creditor rights succeed in improving the access 
of the corporate sector to external finance we lack a parallel conclusive evidence on the 
effects of judicial reforms on the cost of finance. La Porta et al. (1997), Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1998), and Galindo (2001) have shown for a cross section of countries 
that better creditor rights protection improves the access to external finance, while a 
series of works by Bianco, Jappelli, and Pagano (2001), Castelar, Pineiro, and Cabral 
(2001), and Cristini, Moya, and Powell (2001) have shown that different levels of judicial 
protection of creditor rights is associated with different volumes of bank lending even 
within individual countries. Compared with these results we have only indirect evidence 
of the impact of the same variables on the cost of capital and on the cost credit. Claessens   2
et al. (2002) find that market valuation of listed firms is higher with a better protection of 
creditor rights, pointing to a lower cost of capital and a lower discount rate of future 
earnings. On the cost of credit side, international and national evidence is blurred.  
The reasons of the asymmetry in available empirical evidence are twofold: 
theoretical and empirical. On the theoretical front the impact of a more efficient 
organization and enforcement of justice on interest rates is not unambiguous due to the 
simultaneous presence of two countervailing effects. On one side there is the 
unambiguous positive effect of an increased recovery in the event of default on 
(reducing) the lending spread. On the other hand there is the negative impact related to a 
composition effect by which riskier and previously rationed bank customers may, as a 
result of more efficient judicial procedures, access bank credit. This new cohort of 
customers will in fact carry higher rates that may offset the lower rates possibly charged 
to old borrowers. In addition, there is the possibility that banks enjoying a dominant 
position on their respective market may take the opportunity of a more efficient judicial 
system to extract higher rents from their borrowers (Bianco, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2001). 
On the empirical side, the theoretical indeterminacy is reflected in contrasting 
evidence at the national level. For instance, Bianco et al. (2001) do not find significant 
effects on bank spreads in the Italian loan market while Meador (1982) finds significant 
effects on the U.S. mortgage market. We lack similar evidence at the international level, 
as the substantial absence of good quality data on lending spreads has proved to be a 
major impediment to empirical analysis. We have therefore only the indirect evidence 
provided by the positive association of judicial reforms with the ratio of banks’ net 
interest income (NII) over total assets, used by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) as a   3
proxy for bank efficiency. Unfortunately the latter association is not sufficient to infer the 
effects of judicial efficiency on the cost of credit as the ratio may be affected by several 
assets composition effects. For example, a decrease of NII may derive from an increase 
of fixed assets or government bonds at the expenses of the loan portfolio. Another 
potentially important source of bias is given by the inclusion among total assets of non-
interest accruing non-performing loans (NPLs). Other analysis of the determinants of 
bank interest rate margins such as Ho and Saunders (1981) and Saunders and 
Schumacher (2000) have tried to control for these factors through a two-stage regression 
procedure, but none of these studies focuses explicitly on the effects of judicial 
efficiency.  
In this paper we shall focus explicitly on the cost of bank credit, but we believe 
that our results could be taken as indicative of the wider impact of judicial inefficiency on 
the cost of external finance. The policy relevance of an empirical evaluation of the 
relationship between the cost of credit and judicial reforms is manifold.  
The quantification of the average impact that better judicial protection of property 
rights has on the level of lending rate may help to visualize the gains that a cooperative 
behavior may bring to the often opposed constituencies of bank debtors and of bank 
creditors. The potential reduction of the cost of credit would in fact show the extent to 
which a better protection of the creditors could help the debtors to access cheaper sources 
of finance. 
It may also show which one of the competing forces that in principle affect 
lending rates is stronger and matters from the standpoint of countries at a different level 
of development. For instance, the cross country evidence provided by Demirguc-Kunt   4
and Huizinga (1998) points to large benefits of judicial efficiency on the reduction of 
banks’ net interest income, independently from any notion of market power. This may 
hide different levels of judicial effectiveness across developed and developing countries 
where typically banking markets are more concentrated and judges could more likely be 
captive of the economic power. Additional empirical evidence may therefore signal to 
what extent judicial reform and competition policies should go hand in hand in order to 
effectively bring forward an effective reduction of the cost of credit in emerging 
economies. From this perspective our paper is closely related to the paper by  Demirguc-
Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2003), that uses net interest margins as a measure of the bank 
inefficiency and shows that countries with better institutions (including better property 
rights) have lower margins and to the paper by Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga 
(2001) that investigates the role of foreign banks in a cross-country study and shows that 
foreign bank entry reduces net interest margins.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the criteria followed in the 
construction of different measures of lending spreads, describes the explanatory variables 
and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents the estimation methodology 
and illustrates the main empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Methodology and Data 
2.1  Description of bank lending spread variables.   
Our empirical analysis is based on a cross section of bank lending spreads and assesses 
the sensitivity of such spreads to the quality of the legal system and to a number of other 
country-specific variables. The dependent variable is represented by the difference   5
between the average lending rate and the average cost of funds, either measured directly 
at the country level or measured at the level of individual banks but aggregated at the 
country level. The regression format is the traditional one with controlling variables at the 
country level and a set of institutional variables intended to capture the effects of judicial 
reforms. 
  Focusing on interest rate spreads has several advantages over comparing net 
interest margins, a variable typically used in cross-country work on bank efficiency. First, 
net interest margins are typically expressed in terms of total assets, while a correct 
construction of average spreads should refer interest incomes and payments separately 
both to the assets and the liabilities sides of the balance sheet. Second, net interest 
margins typically do not control for the presence of non interest earning assets such as 
non-performing loans. Third, net interest margins are typically based on total interest 
income, which also includes interest from non-lending operations, therefore limiting 
comparability across banks. 
  We construct country-level interest rate spreads following two distinct approaches 
in order to address possible concerns about measurement errors and the robustness of our 
empirical results. First, we use country-level data on average lending rates and deposit 
rates from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. The lending rate in 
IFS (line 60p) is defined as the bank rate that usually meets the short- and medium-term 
financing needs of the private sector, and the deposit rate (line 60l) is defined as the 
average of the rates offered to resident customers for demand, time, and savings deposits. 
We compute the interest rate spread as the difference between the average lending rate 
(line 60p) and the average deposit rate (line 60l) for the year 2000. For Austria and   6
Portugal, we do not have data for the year 2000, and we therefore use data from 1999. 
  For the United Kingdom we use data from 1998. In what follows, we refer to this 
interest rate spread as SPREAD1. While the advantage of this proxy for lending spreads 
is given by the wide scope of coverage, the problem is that a number of countries do not 
collect comparable average rates on either deposits and/or loans. For countries with a 
large component of dollarized assets or liabilities it is difficult to verify whether the 
reported rates are referred to domestic currencies or to the average of domestic and dollar 
rates. Also, the reference group for which IFS reports interest rates differs across 
countries. For some countries, the lending rate reflects the average rate for prime 
borrowers in the country, while for other countries it reflects the average rate for a 
borrower of average quality.  
Our second proxy is given by average interest rate spreads computed at a bank-
level using data from Bankscope and successively aggregated at a country level. 
Bankscope reports balance sheet and income statement data for a large number of banks 
and countries. The advantage of using bank-level data is that it allows for comparison of 
interest rates charged by similar types of banks in different countries, while the IFS data 
merely reflects the spread for the average bank in the country. Using Bankscope data, we 
will be able to compute analytically the value of the average rate charged by an 
homogeneous sector  of the banking system, therefore enhancing the comparability across 
countries. The challenge when using bank-level data on balance sheets and income 
statements, such as the one provided by Bankscope, is that interest rates have to be 
imputed from information on interest income, as data on bank-level interest rates are not 
reported. The problem is that in many countries, banks are not obliged to report interest   7
income on loans separately, and they merely report total interest income, including 
interest from interbank operations and interest-earning securities, such as government and 
corporate bonds. Using total interest income, although more widely available, is not a 
realistic indicator of the return on the lending operations of each bank, and would create 
an upward bias of the estimated lending rate if referred to total loans. In addition, we 
need data on non-performing loans for each bank, since we are interested in the interest 
rates charged by the bank, not the interest rates earned by the bank. 
To enhance comparability across countries, we compute bank-level interest rate 
spreads for the ten largest banks in each country, if available, and construct country-level 
interest rate spreads by averaging across these ten banks by country. Again, we calculate 
the spreads for the year 2000, the most recent year for which data are available. 
In order to construct variables that measure the return on interest-earning assets 
and the cost of funding of those operations, we need data on interest income on the loan 
portfolio, interest expense, total loans, problem loans, total deposits, money market 
funds, and other funds. Since Bankscope does not have such an extensive coverage for 
the interest income on the loan portfolio or for the amount of problem loans, we had to 
restrict our sample to the 35 countries that offer this level of information. After selecting 
the ten largest banks in each country we also collected the data on problem loans and 
interest income on the loan portfolio from the banks’ annual reports in order to cross-
check the data reported by Bankscope and insure their reliability.  For a few cases (12 
banks in seven countries to be exact), we found a discrepancy between the data reported 
by Bankscope and the data contained in the audited financial statements. For these banks, 
we have replaced the Bankscope data derived from the audited annual reports.   8
To enhance comparability across countries, we make two further adjustments to 
the spread of each bank.  First, we use consumer price index data to adjust for the impact 
of inflation on spreads. Second, as we are dividing a flow variable by a stock variable, we 
calculate the average of the stock variable between t and t-1. In sum, we calculate bank-
level lending rate 
L
t i and the bank-level deposit rate 
D
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where II  is the interest income from the loan portfolio, IE is the interest expense, L 
represents the total performing loans (being the difference between total gross loans and 
total non-performing loans), D represents the total borrowed funds (which equals the sum 
of total deposits, money market funds, and other funds), P
a is the average consumer price 
index, P
e is the end-of-year consumer price index, and t indicates year t. The consumer 
price index data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. All variables 
are expressed in local currency. The bank-level spread for the year 2000 is computed as 
the difference between the lending rate 
L i2000 and the deposit rate 
D i2000. This average 
interest rate spread, calculated using bank-level data and aggregating them at the country-
level, will be defined as SPREAD2. 
  The relationship between the two indicators, SPREAD1 and SPREAD2, is shown 
in Figure 1, where the two variables are plotted one against the other together with a 45   9
degree line. As expected, we see that the majority of the observations of SPREAD2 are 
higher (lie above the 45 degree line) than the SPREAD1 observations. An average higher 
value of SPREAD2 derives from eliminating non-performing loans and all the assets 
different from bank loans in the denominator of the average lending rate. Although the 
majority of SPREAD2 values is higher than those of SPREAD1, this is not always true. 
In fact, some composition effects are also at work, by which the spreads charged by 
smaller banks – included in SPREAD1 – are larger than those of the ten largest 
institutions that are the base of  the SPREAD2 computation.   
2.2 The  explanatory variables 
 We use two broad measures to capture the efficiency and enforcement practices of  
property rights by the judiciary (and other legal institutions). The first variable is PROP 
which captures the degree of property protection in the country. This variable is gathered 
from the Index of Economic Freedom constructed by the Heritage Foundation. The index 
ranges from 1 to 5, with a higher score indicating more protection of private property (we 
reverse the scale of the original index). This variable captures (1) the freedom from 
government influence over the judicial system; (2) commercial code defining contracts; 
(3) sanctioning of foreign arbitration of contract disputes; (4) government expropriation 
of property; (5) corruption within the judiciary; (6) delays in receiving judicial decisions; 
and (7) legally granted and protected private property. We use this variable as a proxy for 
the degree to which property rights are enforced in general, and the value of collateral for 
bank loans in particular. 
The second variable is LAW which captures the rule of law in the country. This 
variable is the assessment of the law and order tradition in the country from the   10
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) produced by the country-risk rating agency 
Political Risk Services Group. This variable has broader scope of coverage than the 
previous one in that it catches a broader notion of compliance with legal provisions. This 
index has previously been used by LLSV (1998), among others, as a proxy for the quality 
of the legal system and the enforcement on legal contracts.  
We use the average of the monthly index for the year 2000. The scale of the index 
ranges from 0 to 6, with higher scores for more tradition for law and order. As potential 
instruments for our judicial efficiency variables we use the legal origin variables ORIGIN 
first considered by LLSV (1998). We expand their list of countries and update the legal 
origins for a number of transition countries using the World Bank’s Doing Business 
Database. 
    Several control variables will be considered to account for countries’ 
macroeconomic and structural features and for the average level of bank efficiency. First, 
we control for the rate of inflation INFL using data from the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) database. The rationale for introducing inflation among the 
determinants of bank lending spread needs to be related to the fact that, in equilibrium, 
net interest income should be such as to provide a constant real rate of return on banks’ 
capital and therefore should be increasing in the level of inflation. Second, we control for 
a number of bank regulatory characteristics using the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001) 
database, such as whether the country imposes liquidity requirements, whether banks are 
allowed to engage in non-bank financial activities, and on the degree of entry into 
banking. All these features may affect the degree of competitiveness prevailing in the 
banking and financial markets or introduce quasi-fiscal elements that may affect the level   11
of bank lending spreads. LIQREQ is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the 
authorities enforce liquidity requirements, and zero otherwise. RESTRICT is a variable 
that indicates the degree to which restrictions are imposed on banks to engage into non-
bank financial activities, including real estate, insurance and securities. ENTRY is a 
variable that indicates the restrictions on entry into banking and is measured as the 
fraction of entry applications denied. From the same database, we draw the variable 
STATE which is the share of state ownership in the banking system of the country. To 
control for the impact of the structure of the banking system, we use the bank-5 
concentration ratio from the same database. Our bank concentration variable CONC is 
defined as the ratio of deposits of the largest five banks in the country to the total deposits 
held by banks in the country. We also use a broader measure of restrictions on banking 
from the Heritage Foundation. This variable, which we will refer to as FBANK, measures 
the degree of freedom in banking, and captures the degree of (i) government ownership 
of banks; (ii) restrictions on the ability of foreign banks to open branches and 
subsidiaries; (iii) government influence over the allocation of bank credit; (iv) 
government regulations in banking; and (v) freedom of banks to offer different types of 
financial services, securities, and insurance policies.  
We also control for the degree to which credit information is publicly available. 
Using data from the World Bank Credit Registries database, we construct a dummy 
variable PCR that takes value of one if the country has a public credit register, and zero 
otherwise. Finally, we will check whether the results are affected by the degree of 
dollarization in the country. The interest rate spreads we calculate do not distinguish 
between local currency and foreign currency. In countries where a large share of deposits   12
and/or loans are denominated in (or linked to) a foreign currency, we are therefore likely 
to somewhat mismeasure the average interest rate spread. Ideally, one would want to 
calculate interest rates on loans and deposits in local currency. Unfortunately, such data is 
not widely available on a cross-country basis. We gather information on the degree of 
dollarization in each country from De Nicolo’, Honohan, and Ize (2003). DOLL is the 
share of deposits in foreign currency. All variables are for the year 2000, except for the 
variables from the Barth et al. database that are for either the year 1999 or 2000. Table 1 
shows the country-averages of all the variables. 
Finally, we control for the average level of bank operating efficiency through the 
ratio of operating expenses over total assets, orthogonalized with respect to PROP or 
LAW in order to capture the bank level of inefficiency that is not associated with the 
prevailing legal and regulatory framework. 
After matching the available information for explanatory and dependent variables 
we ended up with a sample size of 106 countries for the estimation of the SPREAD1 
regression. While some variables, such as SPREAD1 and PROP, are available for all 
sampled countries, others, such as SPREAD2, have a much smaller coverage as banks in 
many countries are not required to report interest income on loans separately from total 
interest income. As a result of lower data availability the number of countries for which 
we were able to obtain data for the explanatory and dependent variables for the 
SPREAD2 regression was limited to a total of 32.  
As a first assessment of whether spreads are indeed lower in countries with better 
judicial efficiency, we look at the correlations between our country variables. The 
correlation matrix is reported in Table 2. We find that SPREAD1 and SPREAD2 are   13
highly correlated, despite the fact that they are constructed on the basis of a different set 
of data. We also find that several country characteristics are significantly correlated with 
the spreads. Consistent with our priors, spreads appear to be significantly higher on 
average in countries with more inflation and more restrictions on banking. Somewhat 
surprisingly, we find that spreads are higher in highly dollarized economies, suggesting 
that the dollarization variable captures more general weaknesses in the economy. 
Most importantly, we find a strong correlation in the expected direction between 
our measures of judicial efficiency (PROP and LAW) and our two measures of spreads. 
In fact, together with the degree of inflation and dollarization of the economy, these 
correlations are the highest among all the variables considered.  
3. Empirical Results 
3.1 An  aggregate  specification 
We use a multivariate approach to investigate the degree to which judicial 
efficiency affects the level of interest rate spreads across countries. Table 3 and 4 report 
the results of the OLS regressions of SPREAD1 on the two different indicators of judicial 
efficiency - PROP and LAW – together with the selected set of control variables. Table 5 
and 6 report the same results for the regressions of SPREAD2. 
  We find that both measures of judicial efficiency are strongly correlated with our 
measures of interest rate spreads, even after controlling for a number of other country 
characteristics. Our baseline specification includes control for inflation, the level of 
liquidity reserves, market concentration and the presence of restrictions for banks to 
engage in non banks activities (column 3; Tables 3 to 6). Both the regressions of 
SPREAD1 and SPREAD2 show that our measures of protection of property rights remain   14
strongly significant also after the inclusion of the relevant control variables. SPREAD2, 
which represents our most accurate spread measure, appears to be bear a relatively 
stronger relation to the indicators of property rights than SPREAD1. Among the control 
variables only the level of inflation and quasi fiscal restrictions associated to the level of 
required reserves appear to have an impact on banks’ spreads. 
Some further robustness tests are carried out (columns 4 to 8 in Tables 3 to 6) by 
adding to the baseline specification indicators of bank concentration, activity restrictions, 
entry restrictions, extent of state ownership, and presence of a public credit register. None 
of these additional controls appears to have a significant effect on banks’ spreads nor on 
the explanatory power of the property rights proxies.  
Finally, we test whether countries with a significant level of dollarization may 
have induced a downward bias in the average level of interest rates due to the presence of 
significant share of bank intermediation carried out in foreign currency and presumably 
with smaller spreads. As we can see in column 8 (Tables 3 to 6) the exclusion of 
countries with an extensive degree of dollarization – defined as a dollarization ratio in 
excess of 50 percent – does not alter our main conclusion  as our proxies of property 
rights remain significant. The coefficients of the same variables, though, appear to be 
systematically smaller than in the larger sample, indicating that on average the use of 
foreign currencies does not bring with it smaller spreads and that, quite the contrary, 
dollarized economies are plagued by higher spreads between banks’ borrowing and 
lending rates. 
Apart from the effect associated to the exclusion of the dollarized economies, the 
coefficients of the proxies for property rights have shown a remarkable stability across   15
different specification changes. If we refer to the baseline specification (column 3; Tables 
3 to 6) we see that the property rights’ coefficients oscillate between a minimum value of 
1.41 and a maximum of 1.84 indicating that on average the improvement (increase) of 
one point in the scale of our indicators can bring about a reduction of banks’ spread, 
measured in real terms, of between 141 to 184 basis points. Considering that the 
difference of the average value indicator of property rights (PROP) between G10 
countries and non-G10 middle income countries – included in our sample - is equal to 
1.4, we can estimate that the latter group of countries could achieve a reduction of the 
lending spread of about 2.0 to 2.5 percentage points as a result of the upgrading of its 
property rights institutions to the average level among G-10 countries. For low middle 
income countries, the reduction could be posited between 2.6 and 3.1 percentage points. 
While it is evident that these simulations should be considered as indicative, they 
nevertheless help to quantify the order of magnitude of the benefits that an economy 
could derive from improving its property right institutions. For example, a simple 
multiplication of these values for the volume of bank credit in the economy may give an 
indication of the fee that an inefficient judicial system is extracting from a middle income 
economy or (in positive terms) of the resources that would be reasonable to allocate to a 
judicial reform. This value would nevertheless provide just a lower bound estimate of the 
social cost of an inefficient judicial system as a poor protection of property rights, as 
discussed in Section 1, negatively affects the supply of bank credit itself. 
We conduct another robustness test in order to control for the presence of 
potential endogeneity between judicial efficiency and interest rate spreads. It is in fact 
possible that in countries where a high level of spreads induces a low level of   16
intermediation, governments face a low public pressure to improve the legal framework 
for lending. We use the legal origin of the country as instrument for our proxy for judicial 
efficiency. The first-stage results suggest that this is a valid instrument. The second-stage 
results are presented in Table 7. Panel A shows the results for SPREAD1 as dependent 
variable and panel B for SPREAD2 as dependent variable. Columns (2) and (4) exclude 
countries with a dollarization ratio of more than 50 percent. The IV results are broadly 
consistent with the OLS results in Table 3, although somewhat weaker in a few 
specifications, indicating that our results are generally robust to the use of instrumental 
variables.  
These results are broadly consistent with those derived by Demirguc-Kunt, 
Laeven, and Levine (2003), notwithstanding the difference in the measures of the cost of 
financial intermediation. In both studies, institutional indicators such as the protection of 
private property rights, rather than bank regulations and bank structure, robustly explain 
cross-country variation in the cost of financial intermediation. 
 
3.2 A  disaggregate specification 
Previous specifications did not allow to control for the potential effects of bank level 
indicators – such as size or operating efficiency - on the level of prevailing spreads. We 
have therefore replicated the previous sequence of estimation introducing two additional 
control variables: bank size and operating efficiency. The heavy concentration of banks 
that report interest income and expenses decomposition in a limited number of countries 
(France, Italy, and Japan) has not made possible to resort to a simple cross-section 
estimate based on individual banks data. In order to preserve a balance between the 
observations coming from different countries we have selected an alternative strategy.   17
We have differentiated for each country the observations coming from larger and 
smaller banks, using as a definition of size the ratio of total assets over GDP and as a 
threshold values larger or smaller than 1 percent. This “relative” notion of size (relative 
to each country GDP), as opposed to an “absolute” one (given by the size of total assets) 
responds to the objective of testing whether banks that are larger in their own country 
would face lower judicial costs as a result of different level of political influence. 
 We have then considered the median bank from the segment of smaller and larger 
banks in each country as representative of the small and of the large banks and we have 
computed for each selected bank the value of the spread and the ratio of operating costs 
over total assets as an indicator of bank operating efficiency. The size of the sample and 
the measure of the spread for larger and smaller banks that have resulted from this 
procedure are reported in Table 8. 
  This new set of regressions helps us to control more effectively for the effect of 
operating efficiency on the level of spreads. In this new specification the indicator of 
banks’ efficiency is consistently significant at the 5 percent level across all specifications 
accounting for almost all the explanatory power accounted by inflation in the set of 
regressions of the previous section (Tables 9 and 10). This is perfectly consistent with the 
fact that lending spreads have to cover for higher operating expenses under an 
inflationary setting. We also observe that the “relative” size variable does not appear to 
have an autonomous relevance nor in isolation nor when interacted with the property 
rights proxies, indicating that there is no evidence that judicial inefficiency unevenly 
affects institutions of different size in the same country.   18
Notwithstanding the different construction of the sample and the presence of bank 
level control variables the significance of the proxies of property rights does not appear to 
have been affected and the estimated coefficients appear to be only slightly smaller of 
those estimated in the previous section. Overall, a one point improvement (increase) of 
our indicators would imply a reduction of over 1.3 percentage points of the lending 
spread. Replicating the exercise of the previous section with the new estimated 
coefficients, we would get a reduction of the lending spreads of 1.9 percentage points for 
an average middle income country progressing toward the level of property rights 
protection available in an average G10 economy. 
4. Conclusions 
The definition of different measures of bank interest rate spreads for a large 
number of countries, both at the country level and at the level of individual banks, has 
allowed us to test the effect of judicial protection of property rights on the cost of bank 
credit. In particular, we have investigated the extent to which judicial efficiency affects 
bank lending spreads across countries after controlling for a number of other country 
characteristics. Judicial efficiency, in addition to inflation, has appeared to be “the” main 
driver of interest rate spreads. Not only the statistical significance of the effect of judicial 
efficiency on banks’ spreads appears to be very strong but also the size of its impact 
appears to be remarkable indicating that for an average middle income country the 
improvement of its property rights protection to the average level prevailing in G10 
countries would achieve a reduction of banks’ lending spread of about 2.0 to 2.5 
percentage points.   19
This suggests that in addition to improving the overall macroeconomic climate in 
a country, reforms of the judiciary do improve the enforcement of legal contracts and are 
critical to lower the cost of financial intermediation.   
  More work is needed to investigate the specific channels through which improved 
legal efficiency lowers the cost of financial intermediation. Does it help reducing the 
volume of unproductive NPLs sitting in banks’ balance sheets by eliminating the 
incentives to “strategic defaults” or by reducing the time required to repossess 
collateralized assets? How relevant are the benefits for different classes of borrowers? 
Although we have seen that there is no appreciable difference in the impact of judicial 
efficiency across banks of different sizes it may still be true that some differential effects 
could be associated with lending to different classes of borrowers. For example, it may be 
the case that judicial reforms have a different impact on the pricing of loans of different 
sizes or to borrowers with different access to foreign sources of finance. The extension of 
the present analysis to the impact of judicial reforms on the cost of credit for different 
layers of the population is left for future research. 
   20
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Figure 1:  Comparison between SPREAD1 and SPREAD2 
 
This figure displays the relationship at the country-level between SPREAD1 and SPREAD2. Spreads are 
reported in percentages. The country codes are as follows: Argentina: ARG, Austria: AUT, Canada: CAN, 
China: CHN, Croatia: HRV, Denmark: DNK, Dominican Republic: DOM, Estonia: EST, France: FRA, 
Guyana: GUY, Haiti: HTI, Iceland: ISL, Israel: ISR, Italy: ITA, Japan: JPN, Jordan: JOR, Korea, Rep.: 
KOR, Kuwait: KWT, Latvia: LVA, Lithuania: LTU, Malaysia: MYS, Morocco: MAR, Oman: OMN, 
Poland: POL, Portugal: PRT, Slovenia: SVN, Sweden: SWE, Switzerland: CHE, Thailand: THA, United 














































   23
Table 1:  Variables 
 
All data for the year 2000. For Austria and Portugal, we use 1999 data for SPREAD1 and for the UK we 
use 1998 data for SPREAD1. INFL is the inflation rate. LIQREQ is a dummy variable taking value of one 
if the country imposes reserve requirements on banks, and zero otherwise. CONC is the 5-bank 
concentration ratio in terms of deposits. STATE is the share of state ownership in banking. ENTRY is the 
fraction of entry applications denied in banking, RESTRICT is an indicator of the degree of activity 
restrictions for banks. FBANK is a measure of overall banking freedom. LAW is a measure of the law and 
order in the country. PROP is a measure of the degree of property protection in the country. PCR is a 
dummy variable that takes value of one if the country has a public credit registry, and zero otherwise. 
DOLL is the fraction of dollarization in the country. ORIGIN is the legal origin of the country. Exact 
sources and definitions of each variable can be found in the main text. 
 
Country  Spread1 Spread2  Infl Liqreq Conc State Entry Restrict Fbank Law  Prop  Pcr Doll Origin 
Albania  13.80  0.05 1      2 2.00  2  0  27.80 French 
Argentina  2.75 5.18 -0.94 1 48.00 30.00 0.00 7 4 5.00 4  1  64.70 French 
Armenia  13.49  -0.81 1 50.10     4 3.00  3  0  81.20 French 
Australia  4.67  4.48 0 72.50 0.00 0.00 8 5 6.00 5  0    English
Austria  3.43 3.22 2.35 1 38.00 4.10 0.07 5 4 6.00 5  1  2.30 German
Azerbaijan  6.76  1.77 1 82.10     2 4.00  2  0  78.00 Socialist
Bahamas  1.92  1.61       4 4.00  5   2.80  
Bahrain  5.91  -0.70 1 70.53 0.33 9 4 5.00  5       
Bangladesh  6.94  3.92 1 64.80 69.86 0.79 12 2 2.08 2  1  0.50 English
Barbados  5.22  2.44       4  4   6.40  
Belgium  4.40  2.55 1 74.00 0.00 9 4 5.00  5  1   French 
Belize  8.31  0.61       3  3   1.90  
Bolivia  23.61  4.60 1 68.00 0.00 0.00 12 3.00  3  1  92.40 French 
Botswana  5.24  8.60 1 100.00 2.39 0.33 10 4 4.00 4  0    English
Brazil  39.63 14.57 7.04 1 57.60 51.50 0.74 10 3 2.00 3  1    French 
Bulgaria  8.42  10.32 1 63.00     3 4.00  3  1  54.30 German
Cambodia  10.51  -0.79 1 67.00 16.00 0.67 14 3 2    93.20  
Cameroon  17.00  -2.05       2 2.25  2  1    French 
Canada  1.58 4.04 2.75 0 75.70 0.00 0.13 7 4 6.00 5  0    English
Cape Verde  7.60  -2.48       1  4       
Chad  17.00  3.80       2  2       
Chile  5.64  3.84 0 59.40 11.70 11 3 5.00  5  1  9.00 French 
China  3.60 7.50 0.26 75.00 0.25 14 3 4.75  2  0  8.90 Socialist
Colombia  6.64  9.53       4 1.17  3  0    French 
Costa Rica  11.51  10.99       3 4.00  3  1  41.10 French 
Croatia  8.33 7.19 5.27 1 57.32 36.99 7 3 5.00  2  0  71.10 German
Cyprus  1.50  4.14 0 80.00 3.30 0.00 8 4 5.00 4      
Czech Republic  3.74  3.90 1 74.00 19.00 0.36 8 5 5.00 4  1  13.20 German
Denmark  4.93 2.33 2.92 1 78.64 0.00 0.08 8 4 6.00 5  0  4.40 Scandin.
Dominican Rep.  9.15 16.53 7.72       3 4.00  2  1    French 
Ecuador  7.80  96.09       3 3.00  3  1  53.70 French 
Egypt  3.76  2.68 1 64.70 66.60 1.00 13 2 4.00 3  1  23.30 French 
El Salvador  4.64  2.27 1 75.00 7.00 0.21 13 4 3.00 4    8.90  
Estonia  3.67 8.50 4.03 0 95.00 0.00 0.00 8 4 4.00 4    23.90  
Ethiopia  4.21  0.65       2 5.00  2  0    English  24
Country  Spread1 Spread2  Infl Liqreq Conc State Entry Restrict Fbank Law  Prop  Pcr Doll Origin 
Finland  3.98  3.37 1 96.50 21.90 0.00 7 3 6.00 5  0  2.10 Scandin.
France  4.08 2.90 1.70 1 70.10 0.00 6 3 5.00  4  1   French 
Gabon  17.00  0.50       4 3.00  3       
Gambia  11.50  0.84 1 100.00 0.00 0.86 14 2 5.00 3      
Georgia Rep. Of  22.58  4.06 1 57.30     2  2  0  77.90 Socialist
Germany  6.23  1.95 1 12.00 42.00 0.00 5 3 5.67 5  1    German
Greece  6.18  3.15 0 70.00 13.00 0.00 9 2 3.00 4  0  29.80 French 
Guatemala  10.71  5.98 1 38.00 7.61 0.30 13 4 2.00 3  0  0.10 French 
Guyana  8.59 11.37 6.15 1 13.60 19.00 0.25 9 3 4.00 3     French 
Haití  13.24 10.48 13.71       2 2.00  1    39.10 French 
Honduras  10.89  11.06 1 52.00 1.10 0.20 9 3 2.00 3  1  28.70 French 
Hong Kong  4.70  -3.75       5 5.00  5  0  47.10 English
Hungary  2.97  9.78 1 2.50 0.33 9 4 4.33  4  0  21.80 German
Iceland  9.69 4.07 5.16 1 64.00 0.00 11 3 6.00  5       
Indonesia  5.95  3.72 0 52.87 44.00 0.60 14 2 2.00 3  1  20.80 French 
Ireland  4.67  5.56 1   0.00 8 4 6.00  5  0    English
Israel  4.24 2.08 1.12 0 80.00   13 3 5.00  4  0  18.70 English
Italy  4.42 3.15 2.54 0 25.10 17.00 0.26 10 4 6.00 4  1  4.20 French 
Jamaica  11.73  8.17 1 73.50 56.00 12 3 2.00  4  0  23.00 English
Japan  2.00 1.56 -0.67 1 31.05 1.15 0.00 13 3 5.08 5  0  5.80 German
Jordan  4.83 7.72 0.67 1 68.10 0.00 11 4 4.00  4  1    French 
Kenya  14.24  9.98 1 62.00 0.85 10 4 2.00  3  0  15.50 English
Korea Rep. Of  0.61 4.31 2.25 1 47.50 29.70 9 3 4.00  5  0  3.40 German
Kuwait  2.98 3.24 1.81 1    10 3 5.00  5       
Kyrgyzstan  33.52  18.69 45.30      3  2  0  66.10 Socialist
Latvia  7.49 7.85 2.65 1   0.00 8 4 5.00  3  0  45.20 German
Lebanon  6.94   1 39.70 0.00 0.00 11 4 4.00 3  0  62.30 French 
Lesotho  12.20  6.13 1 56.00 51.00 0.00 12 2 3       
Lithuania  8.29 8.29 1.01 1 90.00 44.00 0.50 9 3 4.00 3  1  45.70 French 
Madagascar  11.50  12.03       2 3.00  3  1    French 
Malawi  19.88  29.58 1 73.30 48.90 0.29 13 3 4.00 3  0  22.00 English
Malaysia  3.41 5.70 1.53 1 30.00 0.00 10 3 3.00  4  1  3.30 English
Malta  2.42  2.37 1 100.00 0.00 0.00 3 5.50  4       
Mexico  11.96  9.50 80.00 25.00  12 2 2.00  3  1  10.40 French 
Moldova Rep. Of  8.91  31.29 70.63 7.05 0.33 7 3 5.00  3  0  48.80 Socialist
Mongolia  15.95  11.60       3 4.00  3  1  43.70 Socialist
Morocco  8.15 6.20 1.89 1 75.00 23.90 0.00 13 3 6.00 3  1    French 
Mozambique  9.34  12.72       3 3.00  2  1  45.00 French 
Namibia  7.89  8.99 1 100.00 0.67 11 4 6.00  4       
Netherlands  1.90  2.52 0 88.00 5.90 0.00 6 5 6.00 5  0  4.70 French 
New Zealand  3.86  2.62 0 91.00 0.00 0.00 4 5 6.00 5  0  3.40 English
Nigeria  9.58  14.52 1 51.18 13.00 0.00 2 3.00  2  1  5.40 English
Norway  1.49  3.09       3 6.00  5  0  3.50 Scandin.
Oman  2.44 5.97 -1.11 1 76.70 0.00 0.00 13 2 5.00 3      
Panama  3.41  1.50 1 30.40 11.56 0.06 8 5 3.00 3  0    French 
Paraguay  11.06  8.98       4 3.00  2    62.20    25
Country  Spread1 Spread2  Infl Liqreq Conc State Entry Restrict Fbank Law  Prop  Pcr Doll Origin 
Peru  14.62  3.76 1 81.20 2.50 0.00 8 4 3.00 3  1  68.30 French 
Philippines  2.60  4.32 1 45.59 12.12 0.34 7 3 3.08 4  0  32.30 French 
Poland  5.83 6.85 10.13 0 57.20 43.70 0.00 10 3 4.00 4  0  17.50 German
Portugal  2.79 4.94 2.87 0 81.70 20.80 0.00 9 3 5.00 4  1    French 
Russian Federation  17.93  20.75 1 80.00 68.00 8 2 3.00  3  0  37.40 Socialist
Singapore  4.12  1.36 1 0.00  8 4 6.00  5  0    English
Slovakia  6.44  12.04 1 71.30     3 4.58  3  1  17.60 German
Slovenia  5.72 5.99 8.87 1 63.80 39.60 0.00 9 3 5.00 4  1  34.50 German
South Africa  5.30  5.25 1 85.00 0.00 0.26 8 3 2.00 3  0  4.20 English
Spain  2.22  3.43 0 49.00 0.00 0.00 7 4 4.00 4  1  1.80 French 
Sri Lanka  6.99  6.18 1 55.00  7 3 3.00  3  0    English
Sweden  3.67 2.19 1.00 0 0.00 0.07 9 4 6.00  4  0  2.10 Scandin.
Switzerland  1.29 2.67 1.58 1 65.00 15.00 0.00 5 5 6.00 5  0  0.60 German
Tanzania  14.19  5.92       3 5.00  3  0  30.20 English
Thailand  4.54 3.74 1.55 1 74.83 30.67 1.00 9 3 5.00 4  0  1.40 English
Trinidad & Tobago  8.35  3.56 0 75.30 15.00 0.25 9 4 4.00 5    27.80  
Uganda  13.08  2.83       3 4.00  3  0  29.90 English
Ukraine  27.81          2 4.00  2  1  38.40 Socialist
United Kingdom  2.73 3.44 2.93 0 0.00  5 5 6.00  5  0  15.10 English
Uruguay  36.94  4.76       4 3.00  4  1  81.60 French 
United States  2.77  3.38 0 20.80 0.00 0.00 12 4 6.00 5  0    English
Venezuela  8.90  16.20 1 63.82 4.87 0.11 10 3 4.00 3  1  0.20 French 
Vietnam  6.90 4.94 -1.71 1 65.00   14 2 5.00  1  1  41.20 Socialist
Zambia  18.56   1 83.00 23.00 0.00 13 4 4.00  3  0  53.20 English
Zimbabwe  18.04  55.87       3 2.50  2  0    English
Total  8.67 5.90 6.42 0.77 65.27 18.72 0.20 9.58 3.26 4.18 3.50  0.44 29.28   26
Table 2:  Correlation matrix 
 
All data for the year 2000. For Austria and Portugal, we use 1999 data for SPREAD1 and for the UK we use 1998 data 
for SPREAD1. INFL is the inflation rate. LIQREQ is a dummy variable taking value of one if the country imposes 
reserve requirements on banks, and zero otherwise. CONC is the 5-bank concentration ratio in terms of deposits. STATE 
is the share of state ownership in banking. ENTRY is the fraction of entry applications denied in banking, RESTRICT is 
an indicator of the degree of activity restrictions for banks. FBANK is a measure of overall banking freedom. LAW is a 
measure of the law and order in the country. PROP is a measure of the degree of property protection in the country. PCR 
is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the country has a public credit registry, and zero otherwise. DOLL is the 
fraction of dollarization in the country. ORIGIN is the legal origin of the country. Exact sources and definitions of each 
variable can be found in the main text.  
 
 Spread1  Spread2  Infl  Liqreq  Conc  State Entry  Restrict  Fbank  Law  Prop Pcr  Doll 
Spread1  1.00              
              
Spread2  ***0.59  1.00             
  0 . 0 0               
Infl  ***0.61  ***0.53  1.00            
  0.00  0.01             
Liqreq  **0.33  0.01  0.22  1.00         
  0.02  0.98  0.12            
Conc 0.12  0.39  0.10  -0.09 1.00        
  0.43  0.11  0.49  0.56         
State  ***0.48  0.37  0.20  **0.33 0.08 1.00       
  0.00  0.14  0.19  0.03 0.61        
Entry  0.25  0.06  0.07  *0.26 0.05 ***0.50 1.00      
  0.11  0.82  0.66  0.10 0.78 0.00       
Restrict  **0.30 0.12 0.03 0.09 -0.12 ***0.37 ***0.41 1.00     
  0.03  0.60  0.83  0.55 0.43 0.01 0.01      
Fbank ***-0.46 *-0.37  **-0.27  **-0.30 0.07 ***-0.58 **-0.33 ***-0.52 1.00      
  0.00 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.64 0.00 0.03 0.00         
Law ***-0.45  ***-0.73  **-0.28  **-0.28 0.01 *-0.26 ***-0.47 ***-0.44 ***0.53  1.00     
  0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.92 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00      
Prop ***-0.60  ***-0.66  ***-0.36  **-0.33 -0.09 **-0.34 ***-0.50 ***-0.52 ***0.64 ***0.62  1.00   
  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.55 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00     
Pcr  0.11 0.21 0.02 0.13 -0.22 0.21 0.10 0.11 ***-0.33 -0.18  **-0.31 1.00 
  0.40 0.38 0.85 0.39 0.14 0.19 0.55 0.45 0.01 0.18 0.02   
Doll ***0.49  ***0.69  **0.31  0.09 0.22 **0.33 0.08 0.06 **-0.27 -0.18  ***-0.43 0.09 1.00
  0.00 0.00 0.02 0.59 0.17 0.05 0.64 0.71 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.51 
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Table 3: Spreads and Judicial Efficiency: OLS Results. 
 
Dependent variable is SPREAD1. Column 8 excludes countries where dollarization exceeds 50 percent. All data for the year 2000. For Austria and 
Portugal, we use 1999 data for SPREAD1 and for the UK we use 1998 data for SPREAD1. INFL is the inflation rate. LIQREQ is a dummy variable 
taking value of one if the country imposes reserve requirements on banks, and zero otherwise. CONC is the 5-bank concentration ratio in terms of 
deposits. STATE is the share of state ownership in banking. ENTRY is the fraction of entry applications denied in banking, RESTRICT is an indicator 
of the degree of activity restrictions for banks. FBANK is a measure of overall banking freedom. LAW is a measure of the law and order in the country. 
PROP is a measure of the degree of property protection in the country. PCR is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the country has a public 
credit registry, and zero otherwise. DOLL is the fraction of dollarization in the country. ORIGIN is the legal origin of the country. Exact sources and 
definitions of each variable can be found in the main text. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Spread1 Spread1 Spread1 Spread1 Spread1 Spread1 Spread1 Spread1 
Prop  -3.242*** -2.242*** -1.772**  -1.951** -1.653***  -1.976** -1.678** -0.922** 
  (0.539) (0.608) (0.667) (0.754) (0.608) (0.888) (0.679) (0.379) 
Infl    0.391*** 0.486*** 0.430*** 0.536*** 0.427*** 0.493*** 0.519*** 
    (0.084) (0.085) (0.089) (0.116) (0.098) (0.080) (0.059) 
Liqreq    1.720** 1.956** 1.601*  1.742*  1.863** 1.729** 0.773 
    (0.821) (0.822) (0.926) (0.917) (0.923) (0.787) (0.622) 
Conc   -0.004  0.007 0.012 0.014 -0.005  0.005 0.008 
    (0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.021) (0.025) (0.018) (0.018) 
Restrict      0.217 0.215 0.181 0.087 0.150 0.156 
      (0.173) (0.205) (0.199) (0.320) (0.150) (0.145) 
State     0.028      
    (0.055)      
Pcr      1.895     
     ( 1 . 5 7 2 )      
Entry       2.594    
      ( 4 . 9 5 2 )     
Fbank        0.000   
       ( 0 . 5 1 5 )    
         
Observations  106  66 59 52 48 50 58 42 
R-squared  0.23 0.33 0.37 0.37 0.39 0.35 0.39 0.75 
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Table 4: Spreads and Judicial Efficiency: OLS Results 
 
Dependent variable is SPREAD1. Column 8 excludes countries where dollarization exceeds 50 percent. All data for the year 2000. For Austria and 
Portugal, we use 1999 data for SPREAD1 and for the UK we use 1998 data for SPREAD1. INFL is the inflation rate. LIQREQ is a dummy variable 
taking value of one if the country imposes reserve requirements on banks, and zero otherwise. CONC is the 5-bank concentration ratio in terms of 
deposits. STATE is the share of state ownership in banking. ENTRY is the fraction of entry applications denied in banking, RESTRICT is an indicator 
of the degree of activity restrictions for banks. FBANK is a measure of overall banking freedom. LAW is a measure of the law and order in the country. 
PROP is a measure of the degree of property protection in the country. PCR is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the country has a public 
credit registry, and zero otherwise. DOLL is the fraction of dollarization in the country. ORIGIN is the legal origin of the country. Exact sources and 
definitions of each variable can be found in the main text. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Spread1 Spread1 Spread1 Spread1 Spread1 Spread1 Spread1 Spread1 
Law -2.460***  -1.725**  -1.414*  -1.359  -1.487* -1.459* -1.242  -0.551* 
  (0.503) (0.718) (0.794) (0.836) (0.834) (0.798) (0.814) (0.272) 
Infl    0.370*** 0.444*** 0.418*** 0.489*** 0.407*** 0.460*** 0.514*** 
    (0.079) (0.065) (0.089) (0.088) (0.084) (0.061) (0.063) 
Liqreq    2.158*** 2.275*** 2.013*  1.642  2.236**  1.999**  0.940 
    (0.784) (0.812) (1.017) (1.004) (1.077) (0.770) (0.664) 
Conc    0.017 0.019 0.021 0.030 0.006 0.016 0.014 
    (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.019) (0.020) 
Restrict      0.256 0.200 0.183 0.155 0.156 0.210 
      (0.199) (0.266) (0.226) (0.357) (0.186) (0.160) 
State     0.033      
     ( 0 . 0 5 3 )       
Pcr      2.529     
      ( 1 . 5 9 8 )      
Entry       2.408    
       ( 4 . 5 4 3 )     
F b a n k         - 0 . 1 9 9    
        ( 0 . 4 9 5 )    
          
Observations  98 63 57 50 48 48 56 42 
R-squared  0.23 0.37 0.39 0.38 0.43 0.37 0.40 0.75   29
Table 5: Spreads and Judicial Efficiency: OLS Results. 
 
Dependent variable is SPREAD2. Column 8 excludes countries where dollarization exceeds 50 percent. All data for the year 2000. For Austria and 
Portugal, we use 1999 data for SPREAD1 and for the UK we use 1998 data for SPREAD1. INFL is the inflation rate. LIQREQ is a dummy variable 
taking value of one if the country imposes reserve requirements on banks, and zero otherwise. CONC is the 5-bank concentration ratio in terms of 
deposits. STATE is the share of state ownership in banking. ENTRY is the fraction of entry applications denied in banking, RESTRICT is an indicator 
of the degree of activity restrictions for banks. FBANK is a measure of overall banking freedom. LAW is a measure of the law and order in the country. 
PROP is a measure of the degree of property protection in the country. PCR is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the country has a public 
credit registry, and zero otherwise. DOLL is the fraction of dollarization in the country. ORIGIN is the legal origin of the country. Exact sources and 
definitions of each variable can be found in the main text. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Spread2 Spread2 Spread2 Spread2 Spread2 Spread2 Spread2 Spread2 
Prop -1.907***  -1.442**  -1.430**  -2.136** -0.848*  -3.188***  -1.725** -1.241** 
  (0.552) (0.531) (0.627) (0.947) (0.483) (0.702) (0.687) (0.501) 
Infl    0.538**  0.540**  0.402* 0.536* 0.399* 0.581**  0.338*** 
    (0.225) (0.248) (0.215) (0.293) (0.183) (0.252) (0.076) 
Liqreq   1.121 1.134 0.654 1.510 -0.101  1.448 -0.162 
    (1.119) (1.235) (1.238) (1.176) (1.383) (1.345) (0.840) 
Conc    0.002 0.003 0.005 0.014 -0.005  0.004 0.016 
    (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) 
Restrict    0.010  0.030  0.096  -0.207  0.178  -0.158 
      (0.200) (0.247) (0.178) (0.217) (0.246) (0.184) 
State     -0.007      
     (0.040)      
P c r       1 . 6 8 4 *      
      (0.941)     
Entry       1.483    
       (2.687)    
Fbank        1.165   
        ( 1 . 0 0 1 )    
          
Observations  32 24 24 21 21 18 24 17 
R-squared  0.40 0.51 0.51 0.58 0.57 0.74 0.54 0.52 
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Table 6  Spreads and Judicial Efficiency: OLS Results 
 
Dependent variable is SPREAD2. Column 8 excludes countries where dollarization exceeds 50 percent. All data for the year 2000. For Austria and 
Portugal, we use 1999 data for SPREAD1 and for the UK we use 1998 data for SPREAD1. INFL is the inflation rate. LIQREQ is a dummy variable 
taking value of one if the country imposes reserve requirements on banks, and zero otherwise. CONC is the 5-bank concentration ratio in terms of 
deposits. STATE is the share of state ownership in banking. ENTRY is the fraction of entry applications denied in banking, RESTRICT is an indicator 
of the degree of activity restrictions for banks. FBANK is a measure of overall banking freedom. LAW is a measure of the law and order in the country. 
PROP is a measure of the degree of property protection in the country. PCR is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the country has a public 
credit registry, and zero otherwise. DOLL is the fraction of dollarization in the country. ORIGIN is the legal origin of the country. Exact sources and 
definitions of each variable can be found in the main text. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Spread2  Spread2  Spread2 Spread2 Spread2 Spread2 Spread2 Spread2 
Law  -2.282*** -1.891*** -1.840*** -1.840*** -1.561**  -2.405*** -1.882*** -1.525*** 
  (0.411) (0.455) (0.519) (0.533) (0.527) (0.561) (0.508) (0.379) 
Infl    0.339**  0.360* 0.281  0.350* 0.191  0.376* 0.175* 
    (0.155) (0.182) (0.210) (0.181) (0.191) (0.189) (0.093) 
Liqreq   1.053 1.117 0.596 0.858 0.369 1.288 -0.353 
    (0.887) (0.958) (0.947) (0.971) (0.857) (0.998) (0.805) 
Conc    0.015 0.015 0.019 0.032*  0.001 0.017 0.029 
    (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.016) (0.027) (0.026) (0.019) 
Restrict      0.063 0.048 0.035 0.087 0.143 -0.099 
      (0.176) (0.205) (0.162) (0.269) (0.239) (0.196) 
State     0.012      
     (0.030)      
Pcr      1.689**     
      (0.720)     
Entry       0.191    
       (1.969)    
Fbank        0.438   
        (0.672)   
          
Observations  32 24 24 21 21 18 24 17 
R-squared  0.50 0.64 0.64 0.67 0.75 0.76 0.65 0.66 
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Table 7  Spreads and Judicial Efficiency: Instrumental Variables Results 
 
Dependent variable is either SPREAD1 in Panel A and SPREAD2 in Panel B. As instrument for property 
rights, we use the country’s legal origin. We only report the second-stage regression results. Columns 2 
and 4 exclude countries where dollarization exceeds 50 percent. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Panel A: SPREAD1 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Depend. Var.  Spread1  Spread1 Spread1 Spread1 
Prop -2.945**  -1.815***     
 (1.333)  (0.656)    
Law     -2.393*  -0.681 
    (1.285)  (0.604) 
Infl  0.467*** 0.495***  0.378*** 0.499*** 
  (0.102) (0.057)  (0.096) (0.074) 
Liqreq  1.191 0.561  1.422 1.102 
  (1.048) (0.740)  (1.138) (0.740) 
Conc 0.003 0.000  0.026 0.017 
  (0.025) (0.019)  (0.032) (0.022) 
Restrict  0.018 -0.015  0.097 0.210 
  (0.233) (0.195)  (0.294) (0.194) 
      
Observations  48 39  48 39 
R-squared  0.37 0.77  0.37 0.77 
 
 
Panel B: SPREAD2 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Depend. Var.  Spread2  Spread2 Spread2 Spread2 
Prop -1.598  -1.103**     
 (0.957)  (0.442)    
Law     -2.915***  -1.426 
    (0.953)  (0.851) 
Infl 0.488*  0.343***  0.141  0.187 
  (0.255) (0.077)  (0.194) (0.121) 
Liqreq  1.386 0.416  0.179 -0.068 
  (1.052) (0.718)  (1.418) (1.025) 
Conc 0.001 0.005  0.036 0.023 
  (0.021) (0.025)  (0.032) (0.022) 
Restrict  -0.014 -0.090  -0.127 -0.068 
  (0.160) (0.156)  (0.240) (0.242) 
      
Observations  21 16  21 16 
R-squared  0.49 0.54  0.53 0.59 
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Table 8: Variables 
 
Banks are divided into two groups by size and then the median spread is calculated for each group.  Banks are 
considered large if their assets scaled by GDP is larger than 1 percent and small otherwise.  For ten countries there 
are data only for large banks. 
 
  Large banks  Small banks 
Country  Median spread  Number of banks  Median spread  Number of banks 
Argentina 5.00  8  8.03  19 
Austria  2.31  2 n.a. n.a. 
Canada 3.42  4  2.35  16 
China  5.76 5  4.33 2 
Croatia  6.49 9  11.33 6 
Denmark 2.46  7  6.48  12 
Dominican Republic  15.04  10  18.61  3 
Estonia  6.62 2  12.24 1 
France  2.25 14  2.55 85 
Iceland  4.56  5 n.a. n.a. 
Israel 1.57  11  1.86  2 
Italy 2.83  23  4.77  215 
Japan 1.38  25  2.65  617 
Korea,  Rep.  4.31  1 n.a. n.a. 
Latvia  7.58  8 n.a. n.a. 
Lithuania  8.88 3  7.41 1 
Malaysia 5.85  21  2.58  6 
Morocco  5.92  4 n.a. n.a. 
Oman  5.97  2 n.a. n.a. 
Poland 7.27  11  3.88  5 
Portugal 5.57  14  9.05  4 
Slovenia  5.03  3 n.a. n.a. 
Sweden  1.62 6  2.26 4 
Switzerland  2.67  1 n.a. n.a. 
Thailand  3.89  10 n.a. n.a. 
United  Kingdom  3.44  2 n.a. n.a. 
      
Mean  4.91 8.12 6.27  62.38 
Number  of  observations  26 211  16 998 
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Table 9:  Spreads by Size and Judicial Efficiency: OLS Results. 
Dependent variable is SPREAD2. Column 10 excludes countries where dollarization exceeds 50 percent. OVERHEADS_R is the residual of the regression of 
overhead costs over total assets on property rights. SMALL is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when referring to the group of smaller banks in each country. 
SMALL*PROP is the interaction between the size dummy and the judicial variables. INFL is the inflation rate. LIQREQ is a dummy variable taking value of one if 
the country imposes reserve requirements on banks, and zero otherwise. CONC is the 5-bank concentration ratio in terms of deposits. STATE is the share of state 
ownership in banking. ENTRY is the fraction of entry applications denied in banking, RESTRICT is an indicator of the degree of activity restrictions for banks. 
FBANK is a measure of overall banking freedom. LAW is a measure of the law and order in the country. PROP is a measure of the degree of property protection in 
the country. PCR is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the country has a public credit registry, and zero otherwise. DOLL is the fraction of dollarization in 
the country. ORIGIN is the legal origin of the country. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***%; *** significant at 1%. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
 Spread2  Spread2  Spread2 Spread2 Spread2 Spread2 Spread2 Spread2 Spread2 Spread2 
Prop  -2.263*** -2.036*** -2.062*** -1.371*** -1.375***  -1.385** -1.159** -1.403***  -1.221** -1.712** 
  [0.635] [0.644] [0.498] [0.414] [0.489] [0.494] [0.455] [0.406] [0.529] [0.771] 
Small  0.97  3.22  2.292 0.517 0.504 2.516 1.371 -2.252  0.23  -4.718 
  [1.047] [6.104] [4.793] [3.080] [3.257] [2.980] [3.484] [4.085] [3.315] [4.578] 
Small*Prop    -0.59  -0.653 -0.098 -0.095 -0.508 -0.294 0.578  -0.054 1.106 
    [1.448] [1.138] [0.679] [0.730] [0.680] [0.789] [0.912] [0.752] [0.948] 
Overheads_r      1.019*** 0.886*** 0.885*** 0.803*** 0.717**  0.957*** 0.966*** 1.166** 
      [0.238] [0.257] [0.288] [0.257] [0.281] [0.250] [0.277] [0.469] 
Infl        0.276*  0.275*  0.187 0.302 0.155 0.268 0.297* 
        [0.149] [0.153] [0.160] [0.187] [0.125] [0.159] [0.165] 
Liqreq        0.328 0.323 -0.181  0.508 -0.77 0.136 0.151 
        [0.861] [0.812] [0.764] [0.895] [0.723] [0.933] [0.881] 
Conc        0.01 0.01 0.025  0.007  0.033*  0.006  -0.008 
        [0.015] [0.016] [0.017] [0.019] [0.016] [0.016] [0.025] 
Restrict      -0.003  0.11  -0.009  0.206  -0.076  -0.143 
      [0.172]  [0.122]  [0.154] [0.154] [0.243] [0.200] 
State       - 0 . 0 1 4       
       [ 0 . 0 2 9 ]       
Pcr        0.638     
        [ 0 . 8 5 4 ]      
Entry         -0.722    
         [ 0 . 7 8 7 ]     
F b a n k           - 0 . 5 4 2    
          [ 0 . 8 6 5 ]    
            
Observations  42 42 42 33 33 29 30 26 33 27 
R-squared  0.39 0.40 0.58 0.63 0.63 0.76 0.60 0.80 0.64 0.59   34
Table 10:  Spreads by Size and Judicial Efficiency: OLS Results 
Dependent variable is SPREAD2. Column 10 excludes countries where dollarization exceeds 50 percent. OVERHEADS_R is the residual of the regression of 
overhead costs over total assets on property rights. SMALL is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when referring to the group of smaller banks in each country. 
SMALL*LAW is the interaction between the size dummy and the law and order variable. INFL is the inflation rate. LIQREQ is a dummy variable taking value of one 
if the country imposes reserve requirements on banks, and zero otherwise. CONC is the 5-bank concentration ratio in terms of deposits. STATE is the share of state 
ownership in banking. ENTRY is the fraction of entry applications denied in banking, RESTRICT is an indicator of the degree of activity restrictions for banks. 
FBANK is a measure of overall banking freedom. LAW is a measure of the law and order in the country. PROP is a measure of the degree of property protection in 
the country. PCR is a dummy variable that takes value of one if the country has a public credit registry, and zero otherwise. DOLL is the fraction of dollarization in 
the country. ORIGIN is the legal origin of the country. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***%; *** significant at 1%. 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7)  (8) (9) (10) 
 Spread2  Spread2  Spread2 Spread2 Spread2  Spread2 Spread2  Spread2 Spread2 Spread2 
Law -1.805**  -1.946***  -1.911***  -1.343***  -1.325*** -1.299***  -1.354*** -0.678  -1.127**  -1.868*** 
 [0.732]  [0.693]  [0.463]  [0.350]  [0.400]  [0.440] [0.372]  [0.578] [0.490] [0.372] 
Small 0.99  -0.775  -0.55  -4.645*  -4.639*  -4.561 -7.204***  -1.867 -4.314 -5.894** 
 [1.174]  [9.028]  [6.147]  [2.367]  [2.410]  [2.912] [1.810]  [4.317] [2.636] [2.352] 
Small*Law    0.357 0.024  0.934*  0.933* 0.996*  1.456***  0.376  0.85 1.201** 
   [1.670]  [1.141]  [0.475]  [0.483]  [0.575] [0.375]  [0.807] [0.523] [0.475] 
Overheads_r      1.208*** 1.023*** 1.032***  0.948*** 0.910***  1.023*** 1.093*** 1.098*** 
     [0.281]  [0.224]  [0.240]  [0.293] [0.269]  [0.210] [0.225] [0.342] 
Infl        0.322**  0.330** 0.204 0.393*  0.166 0.304*  0.230* 
       [0.145]  [0.150]  [0.172]  [0.194]  [0.119] [0.158] [0.113] 
Liqreq        0.627 0.669  0.101 0.712  -0.67 0.298 -0.354 
       [0.852]  [0.880]  [0.819]  [1.009]  [0.734] [0.972] [0.827] 
Conc      0.013  0.013  0.028*  0.012  0.039**  0.007  -0.006 
       [0.015]  [0.015]  [0.015]  [0.017]  [0.016] [0.014] [0.019] 
Restrict         0.028  0.134  0.008  0.303**  -0.087  -0.261 
         [0.187]  [0.151]  [0.188]  [0.143] [0.264] [0.196] 
State         0.006       
         [0.025]       
Pcr          0.992     
          [ 0 . 9 4 4 ]      
Entry           -0.576    
            [0.766]    
Fbank            -0.782   
             [ 0 . 9 5 4 ]    
               
Observations  42 42  42 33 33  29 30  26 33 27 
R-squared 0.21 0.21  0.49 0.63 0.63  0.75 0.63  0.79 0.64 0.68   35
 